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Summary
This paper studies the incidence of a tax on pure rent within an intertemporal optimizing
model of capital accumulation and endogenous labor with infinite-lived agents. Two
cases are considered for the labor market: the neoclassical theory, characterized by
perfectly competitive wages and no unemployment, and the incentive-wage theory of
the labor-turnover type, characterized by real wage rigidity and structural
unemployment. In the neoclassical equilibrium, the land rent tax is unshifted when
consumers are lump-sum compensated for the tax. If tax revenues are used to finance
government spending, pure rent taxation increases employment, boosts capital
accumulation and reduces real wage as well as land yield. In the incentive-wage
economy, the land rent tax, regardless of the way in which tax proceeds are employed,
always increases employment, capital stock, and land reward, but exerts an ambiguous
effect on the wage rate.
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1 Introduction
Within a finite-lived economy with endogenous capital formation and in-
elastic labor supply, the Ricardian proposition that a tax on pure rent is
unshifted does not hold. The imposition of a tax on land rental income, by
reducing the value of unimproved land, diverts saving from the fixed asset
toward reproducible capital, i.e. the alternative asset, spurring capital for-
mation and raising output. The rate of interest falls, while the wage rate
and the marginal productivity of land increase. The price of land, after the
initial drop, may increase in the final equilibrium because of the interest rate
decline. These results, discovered by Feldstein (1977), are very robust as
they are independent of alternative uses of the land tax revenues.
The Feldstein results, however, hinge on the crucial assumption of non-
altruistic overlapping-generations demographics. Calvo, Kotlikoﬀ and Ro-
driguez (1979) (henceforth CKR) demostrate that in an intertemporal opti-
mizing model of saving and capital formation with Ricardian demographics,
like a dynamic life-cycle model with bequests and intergenerational trans-
fers (as in Barro, 1974), the Ricardian eﬀects of a compensated rent tax are
confirmed. Although the CKR analysis assumes that the tax revenues are
returned to consumers in a lump-sum fashion, the way in which rent tax
proceeds are employed is fundamentally immaterial for the incidence of the
land rent tax.1
1This result (which holds provided that agent preferences are strongly separable in
consumption and the utility of future generations) comes about because, as labor supply
is inelastic, capital stock is pinned down by the ”modified golden rule”. See also Kotlikoﬀ
and Summers (1987).
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Does an elastic labor supply or a variable employment level matter for the
land rent tax shifting and the resource allocation in a Barro—Ramsey—Ricardo
economy?
The purpose of this paper is to answer this question by investigating the
eﬀects of a rent tax in a model of optimal saving with infinite-lived agents
and diﬀerent labor market structures.2 Two cases are considered for the
labor market: the neoclassical theory, characterized by perfectly competitive
wages, variable labor hours and no unemployment, and the incentive-wage
theory, characterized by real wage rigidity, fixed labor hours per worker and
a structural rate of unemployment due to labor-turnover considerations.
In the neoclassical analysis, we show that the consequences of a rent tax
depend on the way in which the tax proceeds are used by the government.
A land rent tax is neutral for the macroeconomic equilibrium (except for the
price of land) when consumers are lump-sum compensated for the tax, as
in CKR. If the tax revenues are spent unproductively by the government,
instead, a ”Feldstein eﬀect” on capital stock and output is obtained. We
depart from CKR, as government spending, by changing consumption, aﬀects
labor-leisure choices and hence capital stock.
In a labor-turnover economy, where firms are motivated to adopt an
incentive-wage policy to curtail labor-turnover costs (as in Hoon and Phelps,
1992, and Phelps, 1994), the imposition of a rent tax stimulates employment
and boosts capital accumulation regardless of the use of the tax proceeds.
2Since our objective is to study an economy that exhibits ”Ricardian debt neutrality”,
we directly use a Ramsey-Ricardo immortal economy (instead of a life-cycle economy with
intergenerational transfers à la Barro).
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These eﬀects stem from the fall in the land value induced by the tax, which,
by decreasing income from wealth, dampens employee quittings and hence
reduces the natural rate of unemployment. In the labor-turnover case, our
findings diﬀer substantially from the CKR ones.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the implications of
the land rent tax in the neoclassical economy. The eﬀects of the rent tax
within the labor-turnover economy are investigated in Section 3. Section 4
briefly concludes.
2 Neoclassical economy
2.1 The model
Consider a real economy populated by infinite-lived consumers that decide
on consumption C, labor supply L, accumulation of nonhuman wealth W ,
and portfolio composition. Population is constant.
Assuming logarithmic preferences, the consumers’ behavior is described
by the following set of relationships3
.
C
C
= r − ρ (1a)
1− L = (1− α)C
αv
(1b)
C+
.
W= rW + vL+ S, (1c)
3See, for example, Judd (1987).
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where r is the rate of return on wealth, ρ the exogenous rate of time pref-
erence, v the real wage, S lump-sum transfers from the government and α a
preference parameter. Equation (1a) is the Euler law of motion of consump-
tion, (1b) is a Cobb-Douglas labor supply, and (1c) the consumers’ budget
constraint.
Nonhuman wealth is composed of two perfectly substitutable assets, phys-
ical capital K and unimproved land T ; that is, W = K + qT , where q is the
price of land. Perfect asset substitutability requires
qr = (1− τ)R+
.
q, (2)
where R is the land reward, τ is a proportional tax rate on land rent and
perfect foresight has been assumed.
Firms operate in competitive output and factor markets. They produce
output X through capital, land and labor by means of a linearly homoge-
neous production function of the usual type: X = F (K,T, L). Factors of
production are Edgeworth complementary. Maximum profit requires that
the factors of production are paid their marginal products
FK(K,T,L) = r (3a)
FT (K,T,L) = R (3b)
FL(K,T, L) = v. (3c)
The economy is endowed with a fixed quantity of unimproved land
∼
T ,
fully used in production. The normalization
∼
T= 1 is used.
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The government maintains a balanced budget. Tax revenues are either
rebated back to consumers or spent unproductively; that is
τRT = S +G, (4)
where G represents unproductive government spending.
The good market equilibrium requires that output always equals con-
sumption plus investment plus government spending; that is
Y = C+
.
K +G. (5)
2.2 Eﬀects of the tax on pure rent
Our analysis considers the comparative statics eﬀects of an exogenous change
in τ , accompanied alternatively, in order to preserve the government budget
balance, by the compensatory accommodation of either S or G.
Since in the long-run FK(K,L) = ρ (overbars denote long-run variables),
we can express capital as an implicit function of labor as follows
K= K(L), K
 = −FKL
FKK
> 0. (6)
Using (6), the core model of the economy can be specified as follows
1− L=
(1− α)[Y (L)−G]
αv(L)
, Y  > 0, v < 0 (7a)
q ρ = (1− τ)R(L), R > 0 (7b)
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τR(L) = S +G, (7c)
where Y (L) = F [K(L), L], v(L) = FL[K(L), L], and R(L) = FT [K(L), L].4
Consider the case in which consumers are lump-sum compensated for the
rent tax, i.e. S =S and G =
∼
G;
∼
G is the exogenous level of government
spending. The increase in the land tax leaves labor hours unchanged, as
(7a), which uniquely determines L, is independent of τ and S. Capital stock,
consumption and factor prices are also unaltered. The sole eﬀect of the rent
tax is to reduce the price of land.
Thus, the tax on pure rental income is unshifted. This result, which
confirms the CKR discovery, is not surprising since saving is not modified
(because of the ”Ricardian equivalence”) and the land tax does not aﬀect
labor-leisure choices.
When the compensatory finance is based on the endogenous adjustment of
government spending, i.e. G =G and S =
∼
S (where
∼
S represents exogenous
lump-sum transfers), the consequences of a rise in τ on the allocation of
resources diﬀer. SubstitutingG from (7c) into (7a) and totally diﬀerentiating,
we get
d L
dτ
=
(1− α) R
∆
> 0,
where ∆ = (1− α)(Y  − τR) + α[v −(1− L)v] > 0.
4The derivatives of the functions Y (L), v(L) and R(L) have the following expressions:
Y 3 =
(FLFKK − FKFKL)
FKK
> 0, v3 =
(FKKFLL − F 2KL)
FKK
< 0, and
R3 = −L (FKKFLL − F
2
KL)
FKK
> 0.
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Thus, a rise in the land tax increases labor hours and, through (6), capital
stock. Output is pulled up, while consumption is crowded out. The before-
tax return on land increases and the wage rate falls. The price of land falls
less than the capitalized amount of the tax, because of the rise in R.
When tax revenues are used to increase government spending, the consid-
eration of an endogenous labor supply invalidates the Ricardian result on the
incidence of a pure rent tax, giving support to a ”Feldstein eﬀect” on capi-
tal stock and output.5 The endogenous adjustment of government spending
alters the allocation of resources and results in the land tax shifting because
the induced change in consumption aﬀects labor supply.6
3 Labor-turnover economy
3.1 The model
In the neoclassical economy, there is no unemployment, since labor supply
and demand instantaneously adjust, so as to eliminate any kind of disequi-
librium that may arise in the labor market.
In this section, we consider a labor-turnover economy, which oﬀers an
explanation for the natural rate of unemployment. The analysis is based on
the works of Hoon and Phelps (1992 and 1996) and Phelps (1994, ch. 7),
which originate from Phelps (1968) and Salop (1979). According to such an
5Contrary to Feldstein (1977), in this case the wage rate falls, while the interest rate
remains constant.
6If the government budget constraint were maintained balanced through the compen-
satory change in consumption taxation, the eﬀects of a τ shock would be qualitatively the
same as those obtained under the endogenous adjustment of government spending.
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approach, firms find it optimal to set wages above the competitive level with
the scope of raising the cost of employees being fired, as a result discouraging
quittings among employees and reducing the firm’s labor-turnover costs. The
firms’ incentive-wage policy results in involuntary unemployment.
Output X is produced by atomistic firms by means of the production
function X = F (K,T,N), where N represents the stock of employees. F ( )
retains all the properties postulated before.
Workers, who are prone to quit their work-place in order to find a ”better”
job, base quitting decisions on the wage policy of the firm, the prospects of
the labor market and their nonwage income. After the workers quit, firms
face turnover costs for recruiting and training new employees. Suppose, as
in Hoon and Phelps (1996), that the unit cost of training a new worker is
βh, where β is a positive parameter and h the gross hiring rate as a fraction
of the workforce; labor-turnover costs are given by βhN .
Each firm decides on hirings, wages and factor use by maximizing the
present discounted value of its cash-flow subject to the accumulation con-
straint for the stock of employees. The relative change in the stock of em-
ployees is given by the diﬀerence between the number of workers hired, hN ,
and the number of workers that quit, ζN , where ζ is the quittig rate; that is
.
N= N [h− ζ(
z
v
,
yW
v
)], (8)
where z represents the expected value of real earnings of a quitting worker, v
the real wage per worker and yW nonwage income per capita. The quitting
rate is assumed to be a positive convex function of the wage paid elsewhere in
the economy in comparison with the wage paid by the firm and the nonwage
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income in comparison with the firm’s wage, i.e. ζi > 0, ζ ii > 0 for i = 1, 2;
we assume for simplicity that ζ12 = 0.
The representative firm’s intertemporal optimization problem is
max
? ∞
0
[F (K,T,N)− rK −RT − vN − βhN ] e−rtdt
subject to (8) and the initial condition N(0) = N0. z and yW are taken as
given by the firm. The first-order conditions for maximum profit imply7
FK(K,T,N) = r (9a)
FT (K,T,N) = R (9b)
b = β (9c)
.
b −rb = −FN(K,T,N) + v + (β − b)h+ bζ(
z
v
,
yW
v
) (9d)
1 = b
?
ζ1
z
v2
+ ζ2
yW
v2
?
, (9e)
together with (8) and the transversality condition lim
t→∞
bNe−rt = 0.
The shadow price of trained employees b is constant according to (9c).
Equation (9d) represents the firm’s labor demand. Using (9c), the labor
demand can be rewritten as
7The concavity of the production function and the assumed signs of the second deriv-
atives of the quitting function ensure that the second-order conditions of the firm’s opti-
mality problem are satisfied.
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v = FN(K,T,N)− β[ζ(
z
v
,
yW
v
) + r]. (9d’)
In a labor-turnover economy, the demand for labor depends on the marginal
productivity of labor, the quitting rate and the rate of interest.
Equation (9e) represents the incentive-wage equation. It states that the
optimal wage set by firms ensures that the marginal cost of a wage rise is just
equal to the marginal benefit (in terms of reduced quitting-turnover costs).
According to Calvo (1979) and Salop (1979), the expected real wage of
a quitting worker in (9d’) and (9e) can be specified as z = Nv.8 Nonwage
income is given by the interest income earned on wealth, i.e. yW = rW . In
this labor-turnover economy, wealth is given by the sum of physical capital,
the value of land and the value of trained employees βN ;9 that is, W =
K + qT + βN .
The resource constraint implies that output less labor-turnover costs must
be equal to aggregate demand; that is
X − βhN = C+
.
K +G. (10)
The demand-side of the economy and the government budget constraint
are the same as before, once L is replaced by N .
8In the expression for z, the labor force has been normalized to one and unemployment
benefits have been disregarded.
9This is because β can be interpreted as the value of one unit of labor asset and N is
the amount of an asset held by the average worker. See Hoon and Phelps (1992 and 1996).
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3.2 Eﬀects of the tax on pure rent
The steady state model can be summarized as follows
v= FN(K,N)− βζ
?
N,
ρ(K + q +β N)
v
?
− βρ (11a)
v= β
?
ζ1(·, ·) N +ζ2(·, ·)
ρ(K + q +β N)
v
?
(11b)
q ρ = (1− τ)FT (K,N) (11c)
FK(K,N) = ρ, (11d)
where the expression for z=Nv, the definition of y
W
and
∼
T=1 have been used.
Consumption and, according to the compensatory public financing scheme,
either lump-sum transfers or government spending can be computed residu-
ally through (10) or the government budget constraint (7c), respectively.
Using (11d), we can express capital stock as a function of the stock of
the employees, i.e. K= K(N) (where K  = −
FKN
FKK
> 0). Employing this
relationship, we can eliminate capital from (11a)-(11c) and obtain10
10The expressions for the derivatives of the Ω( ), Γ( ), and R( ) functions are given in
the Appendix. Equation (12a) gives the demand price of labor. Given q, an increase in N
(and hence in K), in raising quittings of employees (because of the improved labor market
prospects and the higher nonwage income), decreases the demand wage. An increase in
the land price, by increasing nonwage income and hence quittings, likewise reduces the
demand wage at a given N (and hence K).
Equation (12b) represents the equilibrium labor supply price. The supply wage is in-
creasing in N , given q, and in q, given N . An increase in employment pushes the supply
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v= Ω(N, q), ΩN < 0, Ωq < 0; (12a)
v= Γ(N, q), ΓN > 0, Γq > 0; (12b)
q ρ = (1− τ)R(N), R > 0. (12c)
Diﬀerentiating (12a)-(12c) yields
d N
dτ
=
R (Γq − Ωq)
Π
> 0,
d v
dτ
=
R (ΓqΩN − ΓNΩq)
Π
≶ 0,
d q
dτ
= −R (ΓN − ΩN)
Π
< 0,
where Π = (1− τ)R(Γq − Ωq) + ρ(ΓN − ΩN) > 0.
A rise in the land rent tax stimulates employment, exerts an ambiguous
eﬀect on the wage rate, and lowers the land price. The rationale for these
eﬀects is as follows. The reduction of the land value, induced by the rent tax,
causes a fall in nonwage income, thereby dampening quittings of employees.
This stimulates the demand for labor and gives firms the incentive to pay
lower wages. As a consequence, employment rises, while the wage rate may
wage up since quittings are stimulated via the expected wage of quitting workers and
nonwage income. v is increasing in q since a higher land value implies a higher nonwage
income, which in stimulating quittings requires firms to raise their wage supply at a given
N (and K).
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rise or fall.11 Higher employment in turn implies higher capital stock from
(11d) and hence output. The land reward is pulled up. Despite the rise in
employment and capital, income from wealth drops unambiguously because
of the fall in the land price.
These results hold independently of whether rent tax revenues are distrib-
uted to consumers or spent unproductively by the government. The compen-
satory financing scheme for the government budget, instead, matters for the
consequence of the rent tax on consumption. If the tax revenues are rebated
to consumers, consumption goes up; otherwise if tax revenues are employed
to finance a rise in government spending, consumption falls.12
4 Conclusions
We have studied the consequences of a land rent tax within an infinite-lived
economy, paying special attention to the role of the labor market structure.
Two types of labor market have been explored: one with competitive wages
and no unemployment, and one with incentive-wages and structural unem-
ployment.
In the case of an endogenous labor supply and competitive wages, we
have shown that the connection between Ricardian demographics and the
Ricardian incidence of a tax on pure rent, discovered by CKR, requires an
11The ambiguous eﬀect on the wage rate is due to the upward shift of the labor demand
and the simultaneous downward shift of the incentive-wage equation.
12A compensatory reduction of the consumption tax rate that may alternatively accom-
pany the rise in τ would increase consumption, but leave the other qualitative eﬀects of
the rent tax unaﬀected.
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additional element to be satisfied: a special compensatory financing scheme
for the government budget. When tax revenues are transferred back to con-
sumers, such a connection is preserved. If the higher land rent taxes are,
instead, accompanied by a rise in government spending, capital stock, labor
and output are spurred, the wage rate declines, and the pre-tax land reward
is pulled up. In this case, the connection identified by CKR no longer holds.
In a model with structural unemployment, we have found that the land
rent tax increases employment and capital stock, while it reduces income
from wealth and the stock of nonhuman wealth because of the fall in the
land value. Precisely, the mechanics of these eﬀects are as follows. The
tax-induced reduction in the price of land, by lowering income from wealth
compared to the workers’ wage, decreases the quittings of employees. Firms
then find it optimal to pay lower wages in order to dampen quittings and
curtail labor-turnover costs. Lower wages and quittings stimulate labor de-
mand. Employment is increased and therefore capital formation is spurred.
The eﬀect on the wage rate is ambiguous, while the land reward is increased.
16
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APPENDIX
Derivatives of the Ω( , ), Γ( , ) and R( ) functions
The derivatives of the Ω( , ), Γ( , ) and R( ) functions in system (12)
are given by the following expressions
ΩN =
?
v (
v
β
− ξ1)− ξ2ρ(K  + β)
?
ξ1 N
< 0; Ωq = −
ξ2ρ
ξ1 N
< 0;
ΓN =
?
(ξ1+ N ξ11) + (
ξ2
v
+
yW
v2
ξ22)ρ(K  + β)
?
?
1
β
+ (ξ2 +
yW
v
ξ22)
yW
v2
? > 0;
Γq =
ρ
?
ξ2
v
+
yW
v2
ξ22
?
?
1
β
+ (ξ2 +
yW
v
ξ22)
yW
v2
? > 0;
R = −N (FKKFNN − F
2
KN)
FKK
> 0,
where K  = −FKN
FKK
> 0 and v =
(FKKFNN − F 2KN)
FKK
< 0.
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